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Jutland History and the First World War
Key points
Collection of papers from leading scholars in the field discussing some of the
latest research on the naval and maritime aspects of the British Empire s
involvement in the First World War
Sets the centenary discussions of the Battle of Jutland into a broader historical
geographical and conceptual context
Papers discussing the broader sweep of Anglo German relations and the pre
War naval arms race the role of Julian Corbett in shaping the Navy s strategic
plans the latest research on the Battle of Jutland Australia s contribution to
the global war at sea and how the First World War affected the ethos of the
Royal Navy after 1919
David G Morgan Owen is a lecturer in Defence Studies at King s College
London He was previously a Visiting Research Fellow at the National Museum
of the Royal Navy Portsmouth and an Associate of the Centre for Maritime
Historical Studies at the University of Exeter where he gained his PhD in 2013
Dr Morgan Owen has published on British strategy before and during the First
World War in the English Historical Review War in History Journal of Strategic
Studies and The International History Review His first book The Fear of
Invasion Strategy Politics and British War Planning 1880 1914 will be
published by Oxford University Press in July 2017
Jutland History and the First World War
David G Morgan Owen
Kings College London
The nature and significance of the naval and maritime aspects of the First World War
have proven troublesome to convey to a general audience since the outset of the War
itself At the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914 the Grand Fleet of Battle was the
physical embodiment of British imperial technological and maritime might A source of
great national interest and pride it is unlikely that any combination of naval victories
could ever have matched up to the expectations projected onto the Royal Navy by
elements of the Edwardian public Thus when the opening weeks of the conflict
witnessed no second Trafalgar and the Fleet proved unable to prevent the German navy
from bombarding seaside towns killing civilians and bringing the destruction of war to
familiar British holiday destinations in the process cries of where was the Navy were
quick to emerge from incredulous elements within British society Victories at Heligoland
Bight the Falklands and Dogger Bank did little to assuage growing demands for the
Fleet to do more and set the scene for the subdued and gloomy reaction to the
inconclusive Battle of Jutland in 1916
The indecision of Jutland was followed by further difficulties for the Navy as it
struggled to defeat the German submarine campaign against Allied shipping during 1917
Rationing was introduced across the nation the following year making the perilous state
of Britain s food supplies obvious for all to see Thus even with the High Seas Fleet
interned at Scapa Flow after the Armistice in late 1918 the Navy could not shake a sense
of disappointment frustration and failure Days after the end of hostilities with Germany
the First Sea Lord Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss described the situation The Navy has won
a victory even more complete in its effects than Trafalgar but less spectacular and
because of this lack of display one feels that the unthinking do not fully realise what the
nation indeed that the whole world owes to the British Navy 1 As Wemyss realised
coming from a naval officer such words might easily have been dismissed as special
Wemyss to Beatty 12 13th November 1918 in B Ranft ed The Beatty Papers Vol II 1916 1927
Aldershot Navy Records Society 1993 p 12
pleading Yet it is notable that less partisan observers echoed his sentiments Prime
Minister David Lloyd George stressed the Navy s vital contribution to Allied victory on a
regular basis in 1919 as part of his fight to defeat US President Woodrow Wilson s
efforts to curtail the future effectiveness of British sea power at the Paris Peace
conference Reflecting on the War in his memoirs in the 1930s Lloyd George recalled
how there could have been no armies on any battlefield had it not been for the complete
command of the sea which our sailors and their auxiliary helpers on shore succeeded in
maintaining and the British people would have been driven to make peace in order to
avert their famine 2 Both he and Herbert Asquith the former Prime Minister and leader
of the Liberal Party felt the need to stress the contribution of the Fleet to a public they
feared had overlooked the basis of British victory 3
These difficulties were mirrored a century later during the centenary
commemorations of the First World War The decision was apparently taken reasonably
early to focus attention on the naval aspects of the conflict around the anniversary of the
Battle of Jutland in March 2016 The message this choice sent that the War at Sea was
defined by battle and that the Royal Navy had somehow failed to capitalise in this key
engagement of the naval war was as problematic for today s Navy as it was historically
The Navy chose to combat the potentially damaging narrative of failure with a
propaganda campaign predicated upon placing Jutland within the context of the
blockade of the Central Powers thereby attempting to reassert the primacy of sea power
in ultimate victory Jutland thus became the Battle which won the First World War
serving its place in the intense competition for public attention during a crowded
centenary programme which was building towards the Somme centenary weeks later
Insofar as it challenged the popular narrative of a war fought in the trenches of the
Western Front the focus on Jutland was welcome Perhaps inevitably however the
demands of attracting widespread public attention conflicted with efforts to portray a
more balanced account of the maritime war or to translate much of the latest research on
the Royal Navy in the First World War to a general audience The onus is now upon the
academic community to assist our colleagues in public history in enabling people whose
interest in the naval aspects of the conflict has been piqued by the centenary to learn more
about the Navy s First World War and to access some of the most recent thought
Lloyd George War Memoirs of David Lloyd George London 1933 36 Vol V pp 2607 8
A J Marder From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era 1904 1919 Vol
V London OUP 1970 pp 297 98
provoking work in the field This Corbett Paper is one such offering It combines short
essays from five leading scholars of the Royal Navy in the twentieth century to enable
those who have had their interest awakened by the centenary to expand their
understanding of the conflict
The essays in this collection aim to move beyond the familiar Jutland based
narrative of the First World War at sea and to explore the conflict from a range of
perspectives The first two essays from Prof Matthew Seligmann and Prof Andrew
Lambert set the Navy s wartime experience in the context of the notorious pre War arms
race with Germany and explain the strategic backdrop against which Jutland took place
Thereafter Dr John Brooks summarises his recent appreciation of the Battle itself
challenging elements of the existing narrative and questioning what impact some of the
key decisions taken at Jutland might have had on the ultimate outcome In the fourth
contribution Dr David Stevens underlines the global and international nature of the
Navy s war effort focusing on the experience of the Royal Australian Navy in the
Pacific Finally Rear Admiral James Goldrick explores how Jutland shaped the culture
and ethos of the Navy in the inter war years and into the Second World War Taken as a
whole these papers demonstrate the breadth and vibrancy of research on the Royal Navy
in the First World War and provide an excellent starting point for anyone wishing to
expand their knowledge of the conflict 4
Free audio recordings of the papers can be found on the Defence Studies Department Soundcloud here
The Reality and Dynamics of the Anglo German Naval Race
Matthew S Seligmann
Brunel University London
The Anglo German naval race was a genuine contest The two protagonists viewed each
other with suspicion recognized that their opponent could undermine their own policies
and national objectives and vied for naval supremacy to ensure this would not happen
To attain this clearly defined end they built warships principally battleships of ever
greater size and power in large and increasing numbers On the face of it these
observations might not seem particularly remarkable or even contentious After all in the
historiography of Imperial Germany there is little serious controversy over the fact that
Kaiser Wilhelm II and his Secretary of State at the Imperial Navy Office Grand Admiral
Alfred von Tirpitz built their new navy with the clearly expressed purpose in secret
internal documents at least if not in public statements of challenging British maritime
power 5 Thus such debate as there is falls on the question of the motive for this
unprecedented act of naval rivalry rather than the fact of the challenge itself Equally on
the British side there has always been and still is a formidable body of literature that
not only acknowledges the reality of the Anglo German Naval Race but elevates it to
totemic status as the archetypal even paradigmatic modern sea borne armaments
competition Peter Padfield s unambiguously titled work The Great Naval Race is a case
in point Both by name and in its broader content this is a book that maintains that the
pre First World War naval building programmes of Britain and Germany programmes
that were explicitly aimed and measured against each other represent the acme of great
power maritime competition Moreover in making this case Padfield not only epitomizes
a major strand of modern historical thinking he also mirrors the understanding of people
at the time Judging by the countless newspaper articles the bitter party political debates
the striking metaphors found within popular literature and the frequent public panics that
all focused on the Anglo German naval race the contemporary British and German
populations saw this competition in the same terms namely as a major factor in the world
Matthew S Seligmann Michael Epkenhans and Frank N gler eds The Naval Route to the Abyss The
Anglo German Naval Race 1895 1914 Navy Records Society 2015
of global diplomacy and also as the defining issue in the fraught and deteriorating
relations between their two countries The psychological consequences of this are well
known and precisely documented A regular trope of German popular culture was the so
called Copenhagen complex the fear that the battleships of the Royal Navy would
appear unannounced off the German coast and destroy the nascent German fleet at
harbour in much the same brutal manner as it had eliminated the Danish navy in the
Napoleonic Wars Equally the idea that the German navy would support a bolt from the
blue invasion of the British Isles featured prominently in British popular discourse most
famously in the best selling adventure fiction of Erskine Childers and the serialized
disaster novels of William Le Queux As these distinct but equivalent national neuroses
illustrate in the world of naval competition both sides suspected each other s motives
feared their capabilities and gauged their rival counter exertions against those of their
expected opponent
Given how familiar the above analysis has become over many decades of research
and writing the reader might well wonder why it needs to be restated here at all let alone
so emphatically The main reason is that in recent times this assessment of the Anglo
German naval race has come under sharp attack from a small group of self styled
revisionist historians who argue that the expansion of German maritime power far from
spurring the Royal Navy into determined counter action actually left the British naval
leadership largely untroubled 6 It was France and Russia or so we are told that posed the
real threat and it was their capabilities and naval force structures that drove British naval
policy In particular it is suggested that as France and Russia had invested heavily in
armoured cruisers but Germany had not they were the only powers with the ability to
mount a determined assault on Britain s lines of oceanic communication and trade and
that this was the threat that really worried British officials Accordingly under the
leadership of First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John Jackie Fisher the British Admiralty
proposed to undertake a naval revolution in which battleships would be abandoned and
the Royal Navy would instead defend the British Isles with torpedo craft and control the
high seas with swift battle cruisers In this context the German navy composed of a
battle fleet that could be bottled up in the North Sea was little more than a defence
mirage and the clamour surrounding the build up of the German fleet was not a genuine
sign of anxiety for the nation s security but simply ill informed background noise
Matthew S Seligmann Naval History by Conspiracy Theory The British Admiralty before the First
World War and the Methodology of Revisionism Journal of Strategic Studies 38 2015 966 84
exploited by a grateful Admiralty to extract ever greater budgets from a reluctant and
otherwise parsimonious Treasury
This argument is not just counter intuitive it is counter intuitive at almost every
level To start with it is hard to see what kind of threat Russia and France actually posed
At the start of the twentieth century the Tsarist Navy was a by word for inefficiency and
incompetence and its capabilities were regularly disparaged in the most vigorous terms by
the British naval attach s sent to assess it So poorly did it perform in peacetime and so
inadequate was it rated by expert opinion that the main anxiety it created in Reginald
Custance the head of Britain s naval intelligence department was that in the event of
conflict it would cower in port and refuse to fight In the end this hardly mattered Such
little threat as it posed evaporated when nearly all its major units were destroyed in the
Russo Japanese war of 1904 5 a conflict that validated all of the negative assessments of
British observers The French navy did not fare so badly as the Russian in the eyes of
contemporary British opinion Unlike their Russian counterparts French officers were
seen as dedicated professionals and French sailors as well trained smart and capable
There was also much to be said in praise of the quality of individual French warships
although not all of them However French naval policy as a whole was another matter
entirely In the last decades of the nineteenth century two competing groups espousing
radically different even mutually incompatible doctrines were vying for control of the
future direction of the French navy On the one hand were the traditionalists who sought
to build up a fleet of battleships that could contest command of the sea with the fleets and
squadrons of the Royal Navy Ranged against them were the advocates of the Jeune cole
or young school They believed that the Royal Navy would always be able to maintain a
larger and more powerful battle fleet than France As a result they asserted that
challenging Britain in this way was futile Instead they sought a more imaginative
asymmetric means of attacking Britain This did indeed involve building bespoke
warships designed explicitly to seek out and destroy British merchant steamers along the
international trade routes Examples of these armoured cruisers were designed ordered
and laid down whenever adherents of the Jeune cole found themselves at the helm of
French naval policy making However this was relatively infrequent and rarely occurred
for prolonged periods The rest of the time control of the French navy rested with
traditionalists who sought to prepare not for the guerre de course desired by the Jeune
cole but for a guerre d escadre against a foreign battle fleet The result of these
differences at the top of the French naval hierarchy was that control over the direction of
French naval policy especially the ship building programmes of the French fleet lacked
consistency As one minister of marine was replaced by another so the thrust of French
maritime armaments changed direction leading to a fleet that was inadequately prepared
both for the guerre d escadre desired by the traditionalists and also for the guerre de
course desired by those who adhered to the Jeune cole Its potential as a force for either
eventuality was accordingly much diminished
Under these circumstances the fact that the Royal Navy pursued a clear and
consistent naval shipbuilding policy paid huge dividends The goal of the British
Admiralty was to create a force structure that in the words of Lord Selborne would be
strong enough to beat France and Russia for certain no matter what the conditions or the
form of attack To this end the British government ordered battleships and armoured
cruisers in large numbers The former formed the heart of battle fleets designed to
overwhelm their French and Russian counterparts should the naval leaderships of these
countries feel brave enough some might say foolhardy enough to send their capital
ships to sea in search of a fleet action The latter could be used either to hunt down
French and Russian armoured cruisers engaged in a guerre de course on the shipping
lanes or should this threat prove insignificant or illusory as many in the Admiralty
suspected to reinforce the British battle fleets and provide them with a fast wing that
could catch and overpower a retreating enemy For Britain therefore the changes and
vagaries of French and Russian naval policy did not lead to a diversion of resource or a
duplication of effort but to a reinforcement of strength suited for all and any of the wars
they anticipated This meant that whether a guerre de course or a guerre d escadre was in
the minds of the Franco Russian enemy the Royal Navy had the ships to deal with it
Indeed in the case of armoured cruisers Britain had an overwhelming superiority As an
Admiralty memorandum from October 1903 recorded
During recent years France has built a number of armoured cruisers for use as
commerce destroyers Great Britain has replied by building a larger number of
still more powerful armoured cruisers our present superiority will be even
greater in the future as we are building 22 more armoured cruisers against 10
building by France and none by Russia
In this context the so called Franco Russian armoured cruiser threat even more than the
Franco Russian battle fleet threat was as the present author has previously remarked a
security mirage 7
By contrast the German menace was self evident to all and sundry This most
definitely included the Royal Navy s Naval Intelligence Department which began to
produce assessments of the potential danger posed by the German navy from the very
start of the twentieth century These reflected not only the scale of the German naval
expansion but also the perceived martial attributes of the German nation and the
excellence of its armaments industry In contrast to Tsarist Russia the naval forces of
which were a byword for inefficiency and incompetence no one doubted either the
excellence of German shipbuilding and engineering or the rigour and professionalism of
the German navy s officer corps and trained personnel In short Germany was a rival to
be respected and feared 8
The accidents of history and geography added to the sense of danger Britain s
Channel coast was well protected Centuries of war with France had left a network of
forts and defended harbours Sheerness Chatham Portsmouth Devonport and
Pembroke that provided secure anchorages that were admirably suited for operations
during an Anglo French confrontation By contrast Britain s North Sea littoral was both
long and poorly protected with many coastal towns and dockyards there lacking anything
but the most rudimentary fixed armaments or defensive facilities Moreover a
considerable portion of this coast was nearer to the German navy s ports than to the Royal
Navy s making it dangerously exposed to sudden attack In effect therefore in the event
of an Anglo German conflict the east coast was both within easy reach of German forces
and vulnerable to attack While it might have been reluctant to admit this in public
Britain s naval leadership was well aware of this in private
Another source of anxiety was Germany s ability to attack British commerce
Unlike their French and Russian counterparts the German navy did not build specialist
warships for this purpose but then it didn t have to The German merchant marine was
the second largest in the world and possessed shipping lines that maintained a global
presence It was universally recognized that in the event of an Anglo German war these
Matthew S Seligmann Britain s Great Security Mirage The Royal Navy and the Franco Russian Naval
Threat 1898 1906 Journal of Strategic Studies 35 2012 861 886
Matthew S Seligmann Spies in Uniform British Military and Naval Intelligence on the Eve of the First
World War Oxford University Press 2006
vessels would be unable to continue with their regular trading activities because if they
ventured onto the high seas as civilian steamers they would be run down and captured by
British cruisers and condemned as prizes of war So what would they do One option was
to lie low in neutral harbours and wait for the conflict to end This was certainly the safest
option but equally it was not one that would contribute at all to the German war effort
For this reason Britain s Naval Intelligence Department considered that Germany was far
more likely to adopt the more productive policy of converting many of its civilian vessels
into men of war and releasing them onto the shipping lanes in order to prey on
defenceless British merchant steamers This was simple enough to do seeing that many of
the officers and men of the German merchant marine already held positions in the naval
reserve and were trained and eligible for such service It was also likely to prove very
effective Given the number of German cargo vessels and their widespread distribution
around the world the conversion of even a fraction of them into commerce raiders if
planned with care would inevitably stretch Britain s defensive capabilities severely
requiring the diversion to numerous quarters of the globe of cruisers that the Admiralty
would have rather stationed in home waters Yet even this expedient should it be
undertaken was not guaranteed to solve the problem for the German merchant marine
possessed an asset that could not be countered simply by dotting trade protection cruisers
around the world Numbered among the register of German flagged vessels were four
remarkable transatlantic liners the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse the Deutschland the
Kronprinz Wilhelm and the Kaiser Wilhelm II What marked these vessels out was their
exceptionally high speed which had led each and every one of them to win the blue
riband for the fastest transatlantic crossing on at least one sometimes multiple occasions
Indeed these express steamers ensured that at the start of the twentieth century what has
once been a distinction that was firmly in British hands now rested securely with
Germany This was not just a blow to British national pride although it certainly had
this effect it also had significant military implications Each of these four liners was
designed and built with their rapid conversion into warships firmly on the agenda
Whereas the British naval authorities might speculate about which of Germany s
numerous tramp steamers might be armed as commerce raiders in the event of war there
seemed little doubt that these four ocean greyhounds would be so augmented and so
deployed and in this capacity their exceptionally high speed made them very dangerous
There were at that time no British cruisers built or building that had the speed endurance
and seaworthiness to run down these liners meaning that once armed and let loose on the
shipping lanes there was no way short of good fortune for the Royal Navy to halt their
depredations This was a threat of considerably greater significance than France s
armoured cruisers which took a long time to build existed in small numbers
underperformed when completed and for which more than adequate counter measures
had already been taken 9
For all these reasons the build up of German maritime power was hardly going to
go unnoticed in Britain nor was it likely to be ignored But what was the nature of the
response Faced with a range of choices about the kind of maritime force they would
construct the German naval leadership decided to build a fleet of battleships designed to
operate and fight in the North Sea Such a fleet they believed would put genuine
pressure on the British government If Germany created a force of 60 battleships the
Royal Navy would need at least 90 to be certain of victory in battle Tirpitz believed that
such a force level was beyond the financial power of the British government to construct
and incapable of being crewed even if it should be built
His calculation was wrong The Royal Navy did not just respond in kind It
responded with vigour and determination Tirpitz wanted a quantitative arms race only
the Royal Navy responded with a quantitative and a qualitative one Adopting what would
now be termed a cost imposing strategy they not only built more ships than the Germans
they also kept making them bigger faster more technologically sophisticated and better
armed with a continuous stream of incremental design improvements In effect the race
that the Royal Navy imposed was both in increasing numbers and in growing unit price
Most devastating of all for the revisionist theory of a naval revolution it was not a race
defined in terms of torpedo craft and battle cruisers but one largely focused upon
battleships A total of 32 of the latest dreadnought and super dreadnought battleships had
been ordered for the Royal Navy by the time that war broke out in August 1914 and all of
them were stationed facing Germany in the North Sea They did not arrive as a result of a
fit of absence of mind but as a deliberate act of policy to face down the German
challenge 10
The Royal Navy was similarly determined and pro active in countering the threat
of German commerce raiders This was an area where British policy evolved rapidly The
Matthew S Seligmann Germany s Ocean Greyhounds and the Royal Navy s First Battle Cruisers An
Historiographical Problem Diplomacy and Statecraft 27 2016 162 82
Matthew S Seligmann The Anglo German Naval Race 1898 1914 in Thomas G Mahnken Joseph A
Maiolo and David Stevenson eds Arms Races in International Politics Oxford Oxford University Press
2016 pp 21 40
easiest and most obvious countermeasure was to build British liners of greater speed and
power Not surprisingly therefore this was the Admiralty s initial response A
government loan as well as an annual subsidy was provided to the Cunard Shipping
Company on the understanding that it would build maintain and run two transatlantic
liners capable both of rapid conversion into men of war and of outpacing their German
rivals Lusitania and Mauretania were the products of this agreement This like for like
solution did not appeal to all naval officers several of whom objected to a policy that was
very expensive and which produced unarmoured vessels of great size and vulnerability
They advocated instead big fast and highly seaworthy cruisers The result of this was the
first generation large armoured cruisers latter termed battle cruisers of the Invincible
class 11 These ships had both the engines and the freeboard to run down a transatlantic
liner They also however had the potential to serve in many other capacities which was
an irresistible temptation to naval planners to divert them to other uses Accordingly a
series of other expedients were adopted These included arming British merchant vessels
for self defence and creating a global intelligence network that could route shipping away
from raiders All of these policies had been enacted when war broke out in 1914 12
Taking cumulatively the quality of German naval materiel the competence of the
personnel the depth and rapidity of the process of expansion the ancillary asset of the
German merchant marine and the geographical difficulties of protecting the British east
coast all combined to make the German threat a great deal more challenging than the
poorly planned uncoordinated and badly run Franco Russian threat Inevitably it
attracted the attention of the British public government and naval leadership all of whom
agreed that it would need to be faced down and defeated This was achieved and it was
achieved as a deliberate act of policy that began contrary to what revisionist
historiography would have one believe with the identification of Germany as the most
dangerous naval rival
Matthew S Seligmann New Weapons for New Targets Sir John Fisher the Threat from Germany and
the Building of H M S Dreadnought and H M S Invincible 1902 1907 International History Review
30 June 2008 303 31
Matthew S Seligmann The Royal Navy and the German Threat 1901 1914 Admiralty Plans to protect
British Trade in a War against Germany Oxford University Press 2012
An Edwardian Intellectual at War Julian Corbett and the Battle
for British Strategy
Andrew Lambert King s College London
University educated trained and practiced at law but independently wealthy Julian
Corbett 153 1922 dedicated himself to the service of the state and especially the
primary arm of national security 13 His work reduced past practice to order and used it to
develop a systematic national strategic doctrine 14 In 1914 his reputation as a strategist
and educator had never stood higher Corbett s key texts England in the Seven Year s
War a Study in Combined Strategy of 1907 and Some Principles of Maritime Strategy of
1911 the exemplary case study and the national doctrine primer had been developed for
the Royal Navy War Course They emphasised the primacy of political direction limited
war sea control economic warfare and inter service co operation 15 Those principles
would dominate Naval Operations the Official History of the Great War where he
recorded the conflict as the basis of future naval education and doctrine development 16
In August 1914 British strategy was the limited maritime method described and
developed by Corbett across the previous decade Yet the British Government committed
the small British Expeditionary Force to France The Asquith Cabinet incapable of
deciding or implementing a coherent national strategy without endangering its own
cohesion allowed itself to be swayed by newspaper headlines and political pressure into a
decision that turned the Expeditionary Force intended to support the Navy in securing
and enhancing British sea control into a continental army 17 This was a clear break with
D M Schurman Julian S Corbett 1854 1922 Historian of British Maritime Policy from Drake to
Jellicoe London Royal Historical Society 1981 is more concerned to record the problems Corbett faced
than assess his achievement See pp 152 4 A J Marder From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol V
Victory and Aftermath Oxford OUP 1970 p 306 Marder dismissed Some Principles as not nearly as
influential as Corbett would have liked p 373
A D Lambert Doctrine the Soul of Warfare teaching strategy in the Royal Navy before 1914 in D
Delaney R Engen eds Military education and Empire forthcoming volume from the 2015 RMC
Kingston conference
A D Lambert Sir Julian Corbett naval history and the development of sea power theory in N A M
Rodger J Ross Dancy Benjamin Darnell and Evan Wilson eds Strategy and the Sea Essays in Honour of
John B Hattendorf Woodbridge Boydell and Brewer 2016
A D Lambert The Naval War Course Some Principles of Maritime Strategy and the Origins of the
British Way in Warfare in K Neilson and G Kennedy eds The British Way in Warfare Power and the
International System 1856 1950 Essays in Honour of David French Farnham Ashgate 2010 pp 219
56 J S Corbett N aval O perations 1 111 Longman London 1920 23
J S Corbett The Seven Year s War A Study in Combined Strategy London Longman 1907 I p p 74 5


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